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Introduction 
 
The Clean Water Act of 1987 changed 
dramatically the way that the nation’s $83.5 
billion in wastewater treatment needs (to meet 
population in year 2008) will be financed (U.S. 
EPA, February 1989). The Construction Grants 
Program that provided more than $57 billion to 
local governments for treatment plant 
construction since 1972 was phased out and 
replaced by State Revolving Funds (SRFs). SRFs 
are authorized to provide a range of loan 
assistance to local governments for wastewater 
treatment plant construction, estuary protection, 
and non-point source pollution projects. 
 
Congress created the SRF Program to de-
velop financial capability at the state level as a 
tradeoff to reduced federal commitment. As states 
and local governments must increasingly find re-
sources to compensate for federal retrenchment, 
in the area of environmental protection as 
elsewhere, SRFs could prove to be an important 
new mechanism to help fill the gap between 
investment needs and resources available. At the 
same time, the move to SRFs increases state and 
local financial responsibilities. Their ability to 
sustain SRFs and to meet wastewater treatment 
needs depends on the broader picture of resources 
available and competing demands for those 
resources. SRF’s effectiveness in meeting 
wastewater treatment needs is also linked to the 
regulatory and statutory framework for SRFs. 
This article outlines the history of financ-
ing wastewater treatment facilities, provides an 
overview of the SRF program, and discusses 
some of the issues that will affect the ability of 
the SRFs to meet our nation’s wastewater 
treatment needs. 
 
Trends in Financing Wastewater Treatment 
Plants 
 
The federal government began investing 
in wastewater treatment plant construction in the 
1950s. Two factors supported a federal financial 
role. First, the huge capital outlays associated 
with the plants made it difficult for many local 
governments to finance the facilities on their 
own. In addition, the health and environmental 
benefits of improving wastewater treatment are 
not confined within local or state borders. When 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1956 
authorized federal grants for the construction of 
wastewater treatment plants, the small federal 
role was considered necessary and important. 
 
By 1972, however, Congress perceived 
that state and local governments were not 
investing enough money in wastewater 
treatment plant construction, and as a result, 
needs were growing rapidly. The Clean Water 
Act passed that year included a much expanded 
financing role for the federal government. The 
Act authorized $18 billion in construction grants 
to local governments through 1976. At that time, 
Congress considered the federal financial 
commitment a temporary subsidy of states to 
meet the large and growing investment needs for 
wastewater treatment. 
 
 
The views and positions expressed in this article are those 
of the aut hor and do not represent the posit ion of the 
GAO. 
The 1972 Clean Water Act also required 
wastewater treatment plants to provide 
secondary treatment of wastewater, further 
increasing investment demands. While the 
federal government 
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provided approximately $4 billion in grants each 
year, it was not enough to solve the wastewater 
problem as Congress had intended. Many local 
governments, especially small communities, were 
at the bottom of a long list of communities 
applying for grant assistance. By 1980, EPA 
estimated that governments would have to spend 
$119 billion to meet the needs of all eligible 
sewage facilities in the country. If stormwater 
collection and treatment systems were included, 
EPA estimated that another $112 billion would be 
required (U.S. EPA, January 
1981). 
 
The federal budget concerns of the 1980s 
caused Congress to look carefully at the relatively 
large outlays of the Construction Grants Program. 
At the same time, the grant program was 
criticized because the availability of “free” money 
caused local governments to undervalue less 
capital-intensive, and sometimes more 
appropriate, solutions to meeting their wastewater 
treatment needs. 
 
Furthermore, responsibility for paying for 
the facilities was removed from the primary bene-
ficiaries, as federal dollars were paying for a large 
percentage of local wastewater treatment 
facilities. As a result, local governments were 
underinvesting in operation and maintenance. 
They did not have the same incentives to protect 
their investment as if local funds had paid for 
plants. In fact, this large-scale underinvestment 
was confirmed in a 1981 report by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 1981). GAO’s report 
indicated that half of the municipal treatment 
plants studied were not charging users enough to 
cover operation and maintenance costs. Only 
eight percent of the plants were setting aside 
funds for plant replacement. Furthermore, sixty-
three percent of plants surveyed indicated that 
they would request additional funding from the 
federal government for plant replacement. 
Creation of the State Revolving Loan 
Program 
 
In the 1987 amendments to the Clean 
Water Act, Congress decided to create a 
permanent source of funding at the state level to 
pay for construction of wastewater treatment 
plants. The Construction Grants Program would 
phase Out over four years, to be replaced by 
State Revolving Funds. The SRFs are authorized 
to provide various types of loan assistance to 
local governments. Uses of the funds are 
expanded from those authorized in the 
Construction Grant Program to include estuary 
protection and non-point source pollution 
control, in addition to financing construction of 
wastewater treatment facilities. 
 
Recognizing the continued importance 
of the federal role in ensuring adequate 
wastewater treatment, Congress authorized 
federal capitalization grants of $8.4 billion until 
1994. States are required to contribute a 20 
percent match for each capitalization grant 
awarded. The local financial obligation is larger 
than under the Construction Grants Program as 
they must repay assistance offered through the 
SRF. However, interest rates are subsidized and 
costs eligible for assistance are expanded from 
those authorized under the Construction Grants 
Program. 
 
Congress restricted the use of the federal 
capitalization grants to ensure that secondary 
treatment requirements of the Clean Water Act 
were met as a priority. In addition, reporting and 
monitoring requirements were added to the 
authorizing legislation to protect the federal 
investment and to ensure the financial integrity 
of the SRFs. The two most important reporting 
requirements are the Intended Use Plan and 
Annual Report. States must submit an Intended 
Use Plan each year outlining how the funds will 
be used, leveraging plans, and other important 
details about projects to be funded. At the end of 
the year, states must submit Annual Reports with 
information on how the money was actually 
used and the financial status of the fund. 
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EPA has attempted to reduce the burden of 
reporting on the states by requiring a one-time 
administrative agreement, setting forth the general 
operating procedures of the fund. The agreements 
do not have to be revised each year unless states 
change the general structure of their programs. 
 
Congress intended states to develop pro-
grams to meet their own needs with a minimum of 
intervention by the federal government. As a 
result, EPA will have a different role vis a vis 
state and local governments than it had in the 
Construction Grants Program. EPA’s objective is 
to act as a facilitator of state programs. The 
agency has provided a range of guidance 
documents and training seminars for states, to 
assist in program development and financial 
management. After 1994, when the capitalization 
grants end, EPA’s role will diminish further. 
 
Establishment of State Revolving Funds 
 
States are slowly developing their State 
Revolving Loan Fund Programs. While many 
states had similar programs in place before the 
1987 Clean Water Act, others were less experi-
enced in administering a revolving loan program. 
Most states have received two or more capitaliza-
tion grants; one state, Tennessee, has received 
four grants. At the end of Fiscal Year 1990, all 50 
states and Puerto Rico had received at least one 
capitalization grant. However, many state 
programs are not in final form. States created SRF 
frameworks in order to secure capitalization 
grants but plan to implement details of the 
program’ over time. 
 
One reason for the slow start in 
implementing programs is that it was necessary 
for states to market the SRFs to local 
governments that were accustomed to the idea of 
federal grant subsidies. States had to convince 
communities that their only option for EPA 
subsidies henceforth was loan assistance. Some 
states have offered additional special incentives to 
cities to encourage their application for SRF 
assistance. To improve their loan portfolio for 
leveraging purposes, for example, states may 
offer low interest rates to financially 
strong cities so that they will participate in the 
SRF Program. 
 
EPA expects that the flexible statutory 
and regulatory framework will result in state 
programs uniquely structured to meet needs 
faced by particular states. In fact, as states have 
begun to finalize their programs, important 
differences have emerged. For example, financial 
strategies differ based on demands for resources. 
States with large investment needs, such as New 
York, have implemented aggressive plans to 
leverage additional money for the fund by 
issuing bonds secured by the federal 
capitalization grants. Other states that do not 
have a large demand for wastewater treatment 
investment, including several mid-Western 
states, do not plan to leverage additional 
resources. 
 
In contrast to the diversity in the 
structure of SRFs, trends in the use of funds have 
emerged, both in the types of projects funded and 
the communities that receive assistance. First, 
very few states have offered assistance for non-
point source pollution projects and none for 
estuary protection. Washington is one of the few 
states that has established a “set-aside” policy for 
non-point and estuary projects to ensure that a 
minimum percentage of SRF resources are spent 
for these needs. While many states plan to devote 
SRF resources to these needs at some point in the 
future, wastewater treatment needs in most states 
far surpass needs identified in the areas of non-
point source pollution and estuary protection. 
However, it is likely that states underestimate 
non-point and estuary needs. These programs are 
new and the extent of problems facing states is 
not clear. In addition, non-point and estuary 
pollution have been difficult to address due to 
the lack of focus on non-point pollution sources 
in the past. Non-point sources are significant 
contributors to estuary pollution problems. As a 
result, states are more likely to direct the fund 
towards wastewater treatment facilities. While 
SRFs are presented by EPA as an important 
source of funding for non-point and estuary 
protection projects, it may be necessary to 
examine alternatives to help meet these needs. 
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A second issue that has been raised 
regarding the use of funds is that a 
disproportionate number of the communities 
receiving assistance are large cities, given the 
percentage of all cities that are large nationally. 
This may be due, in part, to the fact that SRFs are 
limited to providing loan assistance. States 
cannot provide grants through the SRFs. As with 
any loan, communities that are most able to repay 
are most competitive for the limited SRF 
resources. Reinforcing this situation is the need 
for states that leverage to establish an attractive 
loan portfolio so that they can issue bonds at the 
most favorable rates. Providing loan assistance to 
marginally qualified communities can damage 
states’ ability to leverage funds in the bond 
market. In addition to the increased potential for 
loan defaults, the subsidy to less advantaged 
communities might have to be higher, thereby 
reducing the rate at which the fund “revolves” or 
replenishes. Finally, Congress established a 20-
year limit on loan terms, which has an important 
impact on user charges. The 20-year loan term 
reduces the ability of less advantaged 
communities to qualify for assistance and is 
considered low in comparison with 28-30 year 
loan terms that exist for some state assistance 
programs for wastewater treatment facilities. 
 
The “small community problem” in 
securing finance for wastewater treatment 
facilities is not a new one. Under the 
Construction Grants Program, small towns 
received many fewer grants than they should 
have, given their number and population. In 
many cases, this is because small communities 
could not raise enough money to cover their 
share of the construction costs. In 1981, EPA 
reported that communities under 5,000 were 
particularly affected by a disparity in grant 
awards based on community size (U.S. EPA, 
January 198 1). The communities under 5,000 
received only 55 percent of the grants awarded 
even though they represented 80 percent of all 
communities. Furthermore, they received only 12 
percent of the dollar value of all awards, although 
they contained 31 percent of the national 
population. 
 
The cumulative health and environmental 
impacts on small communities of the unbalanced 
distribution of federal subsidies is not well under-
stood. However, the disparity could be worsened 
under the SRF Program due to the potential bias 
in the loan program toward providing assistance 
to wealthier communities. 
 
Other Factors Affecting the Ability of SRFs to 
Meet Needs 
 
Several other factors will affect the 
success of SRFs. Some of these factors raise 
issues that relate to the statutory and regulatory 
framework for SRFs and others deal with broader 
concerns. 
 
Statutory and regulatory issues that affect 
the SRF deal primarily with requirements that 
increase state administrative costs or project costs 
for local governments. Among these are require-
ments applicable to all projects that receive 
federal funds, such as applying Davis-Bacon 
wage provisions to treatment works construction. 
Other requirements are specific to the Clean 
Water Act and have been carried forward from 
the Construction Grants Program, such as 
requiring that applicants for assistance study 
opportunities for using innovative and alternative 
treatment technologies. 
 
States argue that these requirements in-
crease costs unnecessarily, precluding less advan-
taged communities from receiving SRF assistance 
and requiring states to offer higher subsidies to 
offset the costs of federal requirements. States 
view SRFs as their own and argue that they 
should be allowed to develop programs to meet 
their particular needs without federal intervention. 
On the other hand, the federal investment in the 
SRFs and broader interest in maintaining their 
financial integrity support the view that led 
Congress to place certain restrictions on the use 
of funds. Most of the restrictions, in fact, are tied 
to the capitalization grants and not to state 
contributions or to interest earned on the fund. 
 
Another statutory requirement that affects 
the ability of SRFs to meet wastewater needs is 
the limitation on offering assistance to treatment 
works 
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that are publicly-owned. Therefore, privately-
owned wastewater treatment plants are not 
eligible for the same subsidies as publicly-owned 
plants. This restriction and the disincentives to 
private investment that were introduced in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, such as lengthened 
depreciation schedules, reduce incentives for 
private companies to invest in wastewater 
treatment plants. While private operation and 
maintenance of plants is allowed as a condition of 
the assistance, even partial private ownership of a 
plant disqualifies them from SRF assistance. This 
is particularly discouraging given the vast 
investment needs that currently exist and raises 
questions regarding the ability to meet secondary 
treatment requirements of plants that are currently 
owned by private companies. 
 
The Broader Context for Financing Under the 
Clean Water Act 
 
The ability of states and local 
governments to meet the new financial 
responsibilities associated with the move from 
Construction Grants to SRFs can only be 
understood in the context of overall trends in 
environmental spending. Increasing demands on 
state and local resources will mean that demands 
for wastewater investment will have to compete 
with a growing number of other demands for 
environmental expenditures. 
 
EPA examined trends in spending by each 
level of government, and found that, if current 
trends continue, EPA’s share of total environ-
mental expenditures will fall from 18 percent in 
1981 to 8 percent in 2000 (U.S. EPA, May 1990). 
While this study projected that states’ share of 
environmental expenditures will stay about the 
same overall, a study of state expenditures indi-
cates large funding shortfalls for water quality 
programs (U.S. EPA, October 1989). In the area 
of water quality management, including 
expenditures associated with the Safe Drinking 
Water Act and the Clean Water Act, EPA’s Office 
of Water estimated a state funding shortfall which 
increases yearly and will reach approximately 
$409 million in 1992. 
The state shortfall is partially due to the 
fact that EPA grants to states have decreased. In 
1982, EPA grants made up 49 percent of state 
expenditures for water quality programs, but by 
1986, had fallen to 33 percent of state budgets for 
these programs (U.S. EPA, May 1990). Two 
factors indicate a more serious state financing 
problem. First, these data do not include the 
impacts of phasing out the Construction Grant 
Program. Second, EPA grants as a percentage of 
state budgets have decreased in other program 
areas as well. For hazardous and solid waste 
programs, for example, EPA grants fell from 76 
percent of state budgets in 1982 to 40 percent in 
1986. 
 
The impact of increased financial 
demands on the ability of local governments to 
meet waste-water investment needs is also 
important. If local governments cannot meet the 
local share of costs for wastewater treatment 
plant construction, SRF funds will not be used or 
will only be used by a small group of wealthier 
communities. EPA’s study of expenditures for 
each level of government projects that local 
governments’ share of total environmental 
spending will increase from 76 percent in 1981, 
to 87 percent in 2000. In constant dollars, local 
government expenditures on the environment will 
rise from $26.3 billion in 1981 to $53.7 billion in 
2000. 
 
Summary 
 
Establishment of the SRF Program has 
met one of Congress’ principal objectives in 
amending the financing procedures in the Clean 
Water Act, reducing the federal responsibility for 
wastewater treatment plant construction. From an 
efficiency perspective, local investment decisions 
will probably improve as a result of the move 
from grants to loans. Local governments have a 
greater incentive to adequately operate and 
maintain their facilities, if the pressure on user 
charges is not too great. Also, less capital-
intensive solutions to wastewater treatment needs 
may be sought where appropriate. However, the 
success of SRFs in meeting authorized needs 
depends on a number of factors, internal and 
external to the fund. Some of the limita- 
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tions identified may argue for a more flexible 
statutory framework and others suggest the need 
for a comprehensive examination of state and 
local financial responsibilities for environmental 
protection. 
 
Moving to SRFs does not resolve the fun-
damental problem for governments in providing 
wastewater treatment facilities; vast investment 
needs are competing for increasingly limited re-
sources. Creation of a state funding mechanism 
shifts the ultimate financial responsibility from 
Congress to state legislatures. Therefore, the suc-
cess of the SRFs will depend, in large part, on the 
ability of states to meet the financial demands 
associated with SRFs and on the ability of local 
governments to meet the increased financing re-
sponsibilities. 
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